Showing posts with label greek law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label greek law. Show all posts

Rejecting 'Greekness': Classics Athens’ Anti-Immigrant Policies and Practices

This is the second of three lectures I gave  between July 9-13, 2019 as the Onassis Lecturer at the CANE Summer Institute held at Brown University. The theme of the institute was "E Pluribus Unum".  The first lecture has been posted previously here.

NOTE: there are parts of each lecture where I either did not script the text and refer to slides or simply ad libbed. As a result, in those locations, I will either post the slides or will link to previous posts that explain the point I was making.


In my first lecture, I discussed the fact the “Greeks” were a plurality--they weren’t bothered by being both “Greeks” and Spartan, or Corinthian, or Milesian, or Ephesian, or Samian or Egyptian, Phrygian, Armenian, Thracian, even Persian! It’s just how things were. But not all Greeks thought their fellow Greek were their equals--some ‘Greeks’ were, they thought, better than others. The most well know of these ethno-exceptionalists were the Athenians.

Athens, the place where most of my research has focused in the past, had one of the largest ports--Piraeus, a hub for merchant activity, industrial weaving and pottery production, and a thriving shipping industry-- and it had, as far as we can tell, one of the most ethnically diverse populations among the Greeks of the Classical period--thousands of immigrants between the 5th and 3rd centuries BCE flooded into the polis either looking for work or seeking refuge from the continual wars that plagued the Aegean. This is not to mention the tens of thousands of enslaved persons being imported at the same time--enslaved who were both fellow Greeks and non-Greeks. However, the Athenians also had, as far as we can tell, some of the most restrictive laws for foreigners. the metic system (metoikia), which I want to talk about today. It was, I would argue, one of the few only truly racist systems in Greco-Roman antiquity and seemed to depend upon a certain level of anxiety about foreigners and foreignness. It may have been instituted, after all, as Aristotle said--because of ‘too many citizens’.

Is Athens exceptional in this regard? Or is it the case that whenever a population feels they are being pushed out by ‘others’ we should expect this reaction? Does it have to be this way? It’s a question we need to consider more broadly if we want to understand the world we ourselves live in, where debates surrounding immigration, refugees, and national boundaries are ever looming. Understanding Athens is particularly important given how often Athens is used as a model for democracy, its high period of empire and anti-immigration sentiment a ‘golden age’ in our textbooks, popular journalism, and entertainment. For example:


In truth, for about four centuries, Athens rejected the plurality of Greekness and insisted not only on its own supremacy, but sought to engineer Athenian ethnic homogeneity. That thing--racial homogeneity--that I argued the other day did not apply to the Greeks generally was, in fact, an ongoing wish for the Athenians--ex uno unum.

My goal for today is to break this wish down, show its ebbs and flows, its final decline, and the contexts in which it functioned. My hope is that it will give us some food for thought as we enter the second decade of an international refugee crisis in which over 10 million people have been forced by war, violence, corporate exploitation, and interventionists policies of superpowers to leave their homes and seek safety in our own and other ‘democratic’ countries, some of whom (like Hungary, Italy, the UK, and the US) have shut their borders and enacted policies that encourage at the least negligence and at the worst human rights violations and cruelty. 


TIME LINE and LAWS

I will start with orienting us with a chronology and explanation of the policies:

Cleisthenes and the Synoecism, 508/7 BCE:
καὶ δημότας ἐποίησεν ἀλλήλων τοὺς οἰκοῦντας ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν δήμων, ἵνα μὴ πατρόθεν προσαγορεύοντες ἐξελέγχωσιν τοὺς νεοπολίτας, ἀλλὰ τῶν δήμων ἀναγορεύωσιν. ὅθεν καὶ καλοῦσιν Ἀθηναῖοι σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τῶν δήμων.
       
And he made those dwelling in each deme of the same deme as one another, in order that they not ascertain who were the new citizens (νεοπολίτας) when addressing them by patronymic, but would publicly announce them as belonging to the deme. Thus, Athenians name themselves by their demes (Aristotle Ath Pol 21.4).
Cleisthenes' reforms, if we believe Aristotle, involved making citizens out of those who would be in later times called metics. In 508/7 BCE, however, they were incorporated into the new Athens as citizens. Of course, what Aristotle means precisely by νεοπολίτας here is not certain. It could refer to indigenous inhabitants of Attica in places that had not yet been fully synoecized. Or, it could refer to any residents, whether born in Attica or not. Either way, this is a move that creates the idea of a united Attic Athens and everyone no so incorporated is 'Athenian' and will get to be part of the myths and institutions that held it together under the claims of a pure, 'Athenian' descent.

After the Persian Wars (490 BCE and 480-79 BCE) we see an uptick in anti-Persian rhetoric, but also anti-Ionian Greek rhetoric; policy of subjugating Ionians to Athenian control under the Delian League may stem from animosity over the Ionians generally fighting on the side of Persian in the war.

Institution of metoikia--laws (470-460 BCE)


Periklean Citizenship Law (451 BCE): Both parents must be citizens; law was not retroactive, though some scholars (like D. Ogden) have argued [unconvincingly] that this law reflects practice in Athens towards children of a foreign mother prior to the law's passage.


Relaxations (429 BCE, after 415 BCE): There is evidence that the law was relaxed in the face of first the plague and then the disaster in Sicily that allowed citizen men who had a child by a foreign women to request they be granted citizenship. Carawan (see biblio below) argues that the 429 BCE exception was for those whose legitimate citizen heirs had died. After the Sicilian disaster, we have evidence from the 4th c. BCE that it was--Demosthenes and many others speak in orations of their own parents being born "at the time when" it was required to only have one citizen parent. Chronologically, this falls into the period of the Peloponnesian War. There was a stigma attached to this, but it didn't prevent them from being prominent citizens.


After 403 BCE: After the reign of Thirty Tyrants and restoration of the democracy, one of the first things the restored Athenian assembly did was re-establish the restrictions on foreigners--women immigrants could no longer bear citizen children to citizens. Those children also were additionally banned from being heirs to citizens.

A ban on marriage followed a bit later and enforcement seems to have ramped up--penalties for failure to register and pay tax or for pretending to be a citizen: sale into slavery and the person who reported received a portion of the sale. A man name Aristogeiton, is one of the most well known for this. According to Demosthenes 25, he sold his own sister and attempted to have Zobia, an independent metic woman sold as well. 


Around 322 BCE, Athens attempted to put in place a new metic tax, but the city was soon to lose its independence. In 317 BCE, Cassander, an heir to Alexander, imposed Demetrius of Phalerum on the city as its governor on behalf of the Macedonians. He seems to have removed the ban on foreign ownership of property. He may have ended the taxes on metics. Regardless, even with its loss of independent status, the Ahtenians continued to maintain citizenship as the prerogative of only those with two citizens parents and the marriage ban seems to have remained in effect.

Between 200-100 BCE, outside of Athens, we see Athenians in Athenian settlements (like Delos) intermarrying with non-Athenians; Maybe a sign the chauvinism was diminishing? Regardless, after 200 BCE within Athens itself, we see evidence of the ban on intermarriage with non-citizens being lifted--over 40 tombs for Milesian women married to Athenian citizens have been noted and there are likely many more.

This is quite a trajectory and the most restricted times for immigrants in Athens were during the periods when democracy was supposedly at its height. The equality of the citizens could only be achieved, it seems, through exclusions. Otherwise, what was citizenship other than a burden or series of obligations? To make it desirable, it had to have privileges. And instead of making everyone truly equal (economic inequality was rather high), the elites pushed legislation that targeted foreigners (especially foreign women) and promoted national myths that all Athenians were equal in their purity of descent.

 What reasons? Why would they do this? What is the underlying logic?

RACISM, that weed Knox and many others have convinced themselves could never grow in Greece, especially in Athens, which recall, he calls the polis in its advanced form.


But, as discussed in the last lecture, this homogeneity was a myth as was the idea that our concept of race can be applied to antiquity--race in antiquity is different. Instead, we should consider race as a structuring mechanism. Here is Falguni Sheth:


In other words: Race is more a technology that structures human interactions and embeds prejudices against racialized peoples into systems of oppression-- there are three things: human difference, prejudice, and race: race is the institutionalization of prejudice based on moving signifiers for human difference. Sometimes this involves the biological, sometimes not. If we understand, as Sheth does, race not as a ‘descriptive modifier’, but as “a mode or vehicle of division, separation, hierarchy, exploitation’, we can see better how institutions that seem to be, as she calls it ‘race neutral’ are actually how race itself functions.

And this is how the metic system operates. We miss the implications of the system and its nature if we mistake ‘race’ for a something as banal as skin color--a difference of a few hundred alleles in our genes out of about 3 billion.

Let me explain: How was the Athenian system a race system built on racism? I am going to put up a slide at the end with a select bibliography where you can see where these issues have been discussed before. Susan Lape and I are probably closest in our understanding of race in Athens, though she argues from race as embedded within the idea of descent instead of looking at the structures that support the idea of descent based citizenship. My interest is really in understanding race as a system within institutions, even institutions that can purport to be 'race neutral', as Sheth discusses.

5th century (after 450 BCE): Autochthony and the search of purity--eugenics? Ion--lots of discussion also in Herodotus, Thucydides, the funeral orations. There is a large scholarship on this (see biblio below for a selection). Here are some samples from Athenian tragedy that reflect these ideas.





Foreign women in tragedies are points of contamination, danger (Phaedra in Euripides' Hippolytus, Medea, Andromache in the plays named after them by Euripides)--the language around Phaedra, especially, is the language of nosos, disease. The best metic is the one that sacrifices itself for the state (Euripides' Herakleidae) or can offer divine protection (Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus). I discuss this in Ch 2 of the Immigrant Women in Athens book, if anyone wants to take a look at the detailed discussion.

The fact that naturalized citizens in no period could hold the archonship or certain priesthoods--only their grandchildren (so long as their naturalized children married born-citizens) could--points to the fear of reproducing foreignness.

In the 4th century, metics appear in oratory as inherently untrustworthy--Geoff Bakewell has written on this issue in Lysias--another sign of fear of contamination.

380s BCE: Isocrates attempts repeatedly in his speeches to recruit the Athenians to unite the Greeks in a war with Persia. The Athenians weren’t interested--maybe they didn’t see much difference between their fellow Greeks and the ‘barbarians’? He eventually decides Philip of Macedon is a better choice. At least one Athenian wasn't opposed to foreigners...

There was, then, a LOT of anti-immigrant, anti-foreigner sentiment in Athens from the 1st quarter of the 5th century to the last part of the 4th. This rhetoric was accompanied by very strict policies that were very harmful to the metics who lived in the city. But it may have also have been not just prejudice against foreigners--certain foreigners were welcome to the city and over the course of the 5th and 4th centuries, we see various periods when wealthy men are invited to Athens to set up factories (Lysias’ father Kephalos, for example) or are made citizens though having been enslaved (Pasion and Phormio the bankers; Apollodoros, the son of Pasion).

We also see evidence of proxenia for metics, a typically honorary status, that also grants them the right to own land in Athens, if not citizenship. We even see a couple of block grants of status (maybe not actual full citizenship) to refugees from Plataea (427); Samos (403/2); and Olynthus (348).

Its also wrong  o say that Athenians were all hateful to the foreign residents living in the city--#notallathenians. There is tomb evidence that some of the immigrant or slave women living within the city were loved by citizens--despite their status as foreign--nurse tombs:


So, we see evidence of acts of kindness to individuals and even certain groups who were ‘other’. But the policies can overwhelm those individual kindnesses. Those individual acts of gentleness are great, but they are only necessary because there are policies that create incentives to cruelty. And these acts of kindness can be hallmarks of systems of oppression--examples trotted out to show it 'wasn't that bad'.

What do we make of all of this? Why do I think it matters here to think about this through the idea of race?

Let’s go back to the ideas I mentioned earlier from political scientist Falguni Sheth: If we understand that race is NOT a content signifier--it isn’t skin color of hair type or any sort of physiological, visible difference (most of the resident foreigners in Athens were other Greeks, after all)--but the mechanisms used to enforce discrimination, inequality, and oppression through those or other shifting markers, then we can understand better how systems of oppression are formed and how they act. We can see what is happening in Athens as a process that isn’t built into ‘nature’ but is constructed willfully, one law, one lawsuit at a time. It gives us a much more accurate picture of what was happening in Athens and gives us the tools we need to see how their imperialism, ethno-centrism, exceptionalism, misogyny, and militarism intersected and fed each other.

It also gives of better tools with which to see beyond and through the elites of many of our literary sources like Thucydides and the orators and get a better picture of those members of Athenian society who lived at the margins. In other words, it gives us a much more accurate picture of what it was like to live in Athens in antiquity, of what it was like to be the person upon whose labor the amazing architecture was built (many (most?) of the craftsmen were foreigners or enslaved). In other words, the “Glory that was Greece” had an underbelly that we, as Americans would do well to pay heed to because our own history shows that the Glory that is America is built on equally if not worse racism and structures of oppression. By ignoring this aspect of one of the models for our democracy in our teaching and discussions of classics, we allow ourselves to ignore it in our own history and daily lives as well.

CONCLUSION

But, I don’t want to leave us on a down note--as Robin reminded us yesterday, IT’S SUMMER! AND SUNNY!. But also because there are alternatives to this exclusionary model presented by Athens in the 5th-2nd centuries. Miletos. From Miletos, we have a series of decrees that span from around 250 BCE to 100 BCE. Some of them are extremely fragmentary, but they attest to 100s of people from all over Greece, the Black Sea region, Italy and Sicily, Asia, the Levant, and North Africa being granted citizenship in the city over the period. Most of them were granted citizenship as whole families--husband (frequently the husband and wife had the same ethnic identifier, but not always), fathers, mothers, daughters, and sons. Some were individual women, some individual men.


Of particular note are the inscriptions from 228/7 BCE and 223/2 BCE which include large block grants of citizenship to Cretans. These Cretans came to Miletos as mercenaries. We would expect them to have come alone because that is how we imagine mercenaries from Xenophon’s Anabasis. But, no. These Cretans brought their families. And they settled. And then they became Milesians.

We don’t have a lot of records like this from antiquity, and we don't know everything about these decrees that we would like to know about them. And we know that something was going on that caused Miletos to relax its own citizenship restriction, but this is a significant concession.  I imagine that if we did, we would find that many Greek poleis were far more open to foreigners that we often assume because our most well attested example, Athens, twas so restrictive. This evidence suggests--as does the lack of foreign burials in Miletos--that maybe these foreigners weren’t segregated and derided when they arrived, whether as refugees, as freed slaves, or as free immigrants, but were welcomed in as part of the city.



 

The Ancient Frat Bro and a History of Legal Disregard of Women


It is one of those times again where the real world and the world of my scholarship are in horrifying sync. This happens when one works on issues of race/ethnicity and gender. For the last year, it has been the horrors of the current administration's immigration policies and the overt racist white supremacy of our justice system. Now, as I put the finishing touches on an article on strategies used in ancient Athenian court cases to steal inheritances from women and children, I find the strategies and even the language of the cases mirrored in the current supreme court confirmation hearing process.

In the ancient court cases I am working with, women are being taken to court by distant relatives of their dead fathers, brothers, or husbands over inheritances. The distant relatives, wanting the estates for themselves, will say ANYTHING to get their way. The women being attacking through the courts are citizen women, usually widows or the only child of a citizen man. But citizenship for women in Classical Athens was not secure or robust. While there were processes for verifying the status of male citizens that could clearly establish their legal rights, there was no equivalent of a birth certificate for women. You had to provide witnesses in the courts to the fact of a woman's citizen status. And in extreme cases (like Demosthenes 43), you had to provide witnesses that a woman even existed!

Beyond having to verify one's existence, there are other standard strategies. Strategies that will seem really familiar to anyone with any experience of sexual assault cases. The most common strategies (found in the legal speeches of Demosthenes and Isaeus) are:
  • Impugning the trustworthiness of any potential witnesses to a woman's status
  • Suggesting they or an ancestor were foreign--Athenian identity was structured on a racist belief in the purity of the citizen body--foreign women were one of the most feared ways that purity could be corrupted. 
  • Suggesting they or their mothers were prostitutes or otherwise women of questionable repute and untrustworthy to know who the father of their children were. Slut shaming 101. 
All of these tactics appear in the Athenian courts. All of those tactics are on display every day in media reports about our judicial system, especially when it comes to trying to hold white men (especially powerful white men) accountable for their actions. All of them have been on display in the past and now in supreme court confirmation hearings. Anita Hill withstood it. Christine Blasey Ford is dealing with it now. 

The current nominee for the supreme court, Brett Kavanaugh, has been credibly accused of sexual assault. Yesterday, the accuser Christine Blasey Ford gave testimony at the hearings. Dr. Ford's story resonated with everything I remember from my own high school experiences in the late 1980s and early 1990s--I quit drinking my junior year in high school and had to stop attending all the parties because being fully aware of what was surrounding me made me disgusted. The atmosphere Dr. Ford described resonated with my high school reality--even at a large public high school. Rich kids are rich kids regardless of what school they attend and our school in San Diego had plenty of them. The calendar of young Kavanaugh also fits this world--July 1, 1982 is a day everyone should be looking into more.

It also resonated with everything I have learned of college frat parties and rape culture on college campuses. Kavanaugh's demeanor and testimony hit me hard as it brought back two very specific cases I've read. Almost anyone with experience with college sexual assault situations can tell you: He was lying (about the drinking, about what he can and can't remember). He was trying to bully his way to deniability. He probably also had a serious alcohol problem, but can't admit it (he actually cried while talking about how much he liked beer in high school).

That he became a lawyer should not surprise anyone since almost every case we see is that privileged white men who are part of this alcohol fueled sexual assault system (and it is a system) love to try to use legal language and lawyers to protect their privileges. They pretty much always sue and are at the heart of why women don't report on college campuses--they will use the law courts to out their accusers and traumatize and terrorize them as much as they can. There is a lawyer in the town I live in whose entire job seems to be to represent male students who have been expelled for sexual assault. His tactics are no different than we see in the ancient texts. And its goal is to silence women.

Watching the hearings yesterday reminded me that when a woman speaks, whether it is to report or recount the assault or as a questioner, or as an expert witness, or as  judge--the most common tactics are still those used in antiquity.

I am confident that Kavanaugh will get confirmed--that's how power works and there are still too many people who allow it to continue because they imagine they have some access to that power. Or because they may talk about justice, but there is no justice for the non-white, non-men in our world. The identity politics of being a man, being white, being rich, were all on display yesterday. The right to be angry, the right to cry about beer while saying they never blacked out while drunk ("just vomited and fell asleep"). The privilege of having one's "life destroyed" if they don't get to sit on the supreme court. A Marist poll out today shows that 54% of Republicans think Kavanaugh should be confirmed even if he did commit sexual assault. Women aren't fully human to them.* And we continue to let the law be used to ensure it.


*This is a short post and so I've left a lot out that could be added. The issue of race and the ways non-whites in this country are brutalized by the legal system needs to be kept to the front of our minds. Anita Hill's treatment was and is still discounted by white women because of anti-blackness. There is some really good writing being done on that already. I will link them up later. 

On Being a [Foreign] Woman in Classical Athens

It's International Women's Day and so I want to celebrate it by writing not about powerful women in antiquity, but about two not-so-powerful women whose lives were marked not just by the fact of their being women, but, more importantly, by the fact of them being non-citizen or "foreign" women. I say "more importantly" because if it weren't for this foreignness, their non-citizen status, their lives would have been fundamentally different. Because of their foreignness, they were a twice oppressed class. If they were economically poor in addition to being women and foreign, it was a triple oppression. (You can read more about other of these women in a previous post).

Some of you will recognize the women in this post from my book Immigrant Women in Athens. Others, may recognize them from classes you have taken or other scholars' writings on them. They don't make it very far, however, into the popular imagination. We know of them because they were prosecuted in court, a function, I argue, of prejudices due to their foreignness
.

***
Sandys' famous painting of Medea
could just as easily be of a woman 
like Theoris.

THEORIS was from the island of Lemnos. Although Esther Eidinow has suggested she might be a citizen due to Athens' long history of controlling Lemnos, it is unlikely that she would be recounted as "of Lemnos" is she were an Athenian citizen. What we do know, however, is that she was executed along with her offspring for the manufacture and distribution of pharmakia. We learn about her in an aside in a speech by the orator Demosthenes (25.79-80):


He is the full brother of this man on his father and mother’s side and his twin in addition to the rest of his misfortunes.  This man--I will not talk about the rest--but on his account you put to death the repulsive Theoris from Lemnos, the pharmakis, and all her family.  [80] He took these medicines and chants from the handmaid who later informed on this woman from whom this slanderer begot children, the use of charms, and quackery, and (he claims) the ability to heal epileptics, although he himself is culpable of all wickedness.

Here we can vividly witness the precariousness of this foreign woman’s life. We do not know her precise situation, but she was apparently condemned for witchcraft after selling drugs to the brother of Aristogeiton, who then resold them as a cure for epilepsy. She was called a pharmakis, a word often translated as witch, but it probably had a wide range of meanings and is literally something like “druggist” or “pharmacist.” Derek Collins has argued that Theoris was not a witch at all, but something akin to a folk healer (which I agree was most likely the case) whose remedy must have gone wrong and killed an Athenian citizen. Her punishment was extreme. She and her children were executed. 

There is no mention that she had a spouse; she may have been an independent metic ("immigrant") woman with children who earned a living by making and selling remedies and potions of various sorts. The Athenian jury must have determined that her actions were intended to harm or kill, thus the resulting death sentence. We do not know what representation she had in the court. If she was a simple folk healer (akestris) or herbalist (rhizotomos) who sold remedies or even erotic potions to customers, then it is difficult to believe that she intended for anyone to die. In the fourth century BCE, making drugs and selling them was not illegal. It was possible, however, to be taken to court if you sold a drug that went wrong. 

Was Theoris dabbling in magic and seeking to harm citizens with her potions, as her conviction and some stereotypes of foreign women suggest? It is not uncommon to hear slaves or “prostitutes” accused of selling or using love potions in court cases or in comedy. In some ancient cases, we hear of them killing by poison, thinking (Deianira-style) it is a love potion. The associations of harmful magic and drugs with mythical foreigners like Medea and Circe also encourages us to consider that Theoris’ condemnation resulted from prejudice against foreign women. Theoris may also have been a priestess of sorts. Either way, it didn't end well for her or her children.

***

Theano, citizen wife, remembered on her tomb.
NEAIRA is another fairly well-known, but not well-to-do foreign woman in Classical Athens. She is known best from a speech once attributed to Demosthenes ([Dem.] 59) in which she was accused of pretending to be an Athenian citizen when she was supposedly really a sex worker illegally married to an Athenian citizen and passing of her foreign daughter also as a citizen. Most scholars have accepted that she was a sex worker (calling her a hetaira) and many even accept the charges of illegal marriage. I am (not unusually) an outlier on this. 

Neaira, to me, perhaps best exemplifies the way prejudices impact foreign women’s lives in Athens and the violence to which they could be subjected without recourse in law. She also exemplifies for me the way scholars continue to allow those prejudices to do violence to her. Centuries later, we believe her accuser not because he proves his case, but because we buy into his biases and his story.

Apollodoros, the accuser and a political enemy of her guardian Stephanos, attacks her on charges of 1. pretending to be a citizen, 2. living in marriage with an Athenian citizen, and further, 3. attempting to pass off her own children as citizens. The speech, however, is only minimally interested in proving these charges. Instead, Apollodoros devotes the bulk of his time to weaving a sordid tale of Neaira's life from a childhood as a brothel slave to her days as a supposed sex worker in Athens itself, though the events he recounts mostly took place decades, before this case is taken to court. Neaira’s situation and the case presented against her has been much discussed by scholars--no surprise given how salacious the details are and how much of a supposed insight the speech gives us into the lives of sex workers. It is a story intended to make the jury unsympathetic to the accused, but one that demonstrates as well the violence that a foreign woman was subjected to (not to mention the prejudices). 

I think we can believe that Neaira was likely a sex worker when she was a slave--all slaves were technically able to be prostituted without restrictions--but after buying her freedom, she seems to have been uninterested in continuing that trade. As an independent woman, however, she was dependent on the goodwill of men, and particularly citizen men, for her safety particularly since she had no male relatives to properly represent her in court. 

After buying her freedom, she came to Athens with the citizen Phrynion (he had lent her some of the money she needed to buy her freedom). According to the speech, she ran away from Phrynion to Megara soon after, where Stephanos later met her. She left because Phrynion, Apollodoros tells us, treated her like as if she were his private prostitute and, beyond that, permitted her to be raped in his company, possibly even gang rape. Even Apollodoros is unable to hide the fact that Neaira was brutally abused and was horrified at this treatment of her person (he tells us that she had expected that Phrynion loved her, but was instead treated with ‘wanton outrage’).  

After she fled Phrynion, she secured the guardianship of Stephanos. Phrynion, however, attempted to have her enslaved to him by accusing her of being an escaped slave. Stephanos stood with her in front of officials and she was granted the status of a free, independent metic. Maybe they formed a relationship. Maybe, as I have considered previously, he hired Neaira to take care of his two children after their mother had died (not an uncommon occurrence in antiquity). Maybe she actually once was "just the nanny." Whether they had a more intimate relationship later wasn't illegal (unless it was marriage), but it might have angered those who thought foreigners shouldn't mix with citizens. 

And yet, the treatment Neaira was subjected to by Phrynion and his friends seems to have been justifiable in Apollodoros’ estimation in no small part because of Neaira’s former status as a slave and her supposedly sordid life as a sex worker and her status as a foreigner in the city.  He expects his audience to assume the worst of her, to assume she is still a sex worker, to assume that she would steal citizenship. He also hopes that the jury will believe that the children of Stephanos are his by Neaira and so not citizens (we don't know their ages and no wife is mentioned). And the penalty to Neaira if the case succeeded? She would be sold into slavery. 

It isn't a coincidence that Apollodorus ends his speech with an appeal to the jury in the name of protecting their citizen wives and daughters. He wants to divide this foreign woman Neaira from those other, "proper" women in their lives. Neaira isn't a “whore” and corrupt and deserving of enslavement because she is a woman, but because she's foreign. And the prejudices against her run deep. 

Some (most)  scholars believe Apollodorus. I do not. We don't know how this case turned out. But we do know that he was a notorious liar. He was banned from prosecuting others in the courts, including his step-father. In his attacks on his step-father, he also accused his own mother of complicity in murder (of his father!) and implied that his brother was the child not of their father but of his mother in adultery with his step-father. He did this without proof, without any shame. And the Athenians got so tired of his frivolous lawsuits against his step-father, that they banned him from continuing them. 

Given this background, why should we believe him in this one case? Why does he and not Neaira deserve the benefit of the doubt? Why is it that even feminist scholars continue to believe him and not read between the lines and see his biases and question what has long been regarded as truth? Why is it that we can't see that her foreignness here is more important than her being just a woman? Because if she wasn't foreign, she could been Stephanos' wife. And any charges that she was illegally married would be moot. If she was a citizen of some city, she would never have been in a brothel as a slave, having to buy her freedom and make a new life for herself somewhere else on her own. 

***

Both Neaira's and Theoris' lives were defined by their being women in many ways. But their experiences as we know of them were fundamentally impacted (for the worse) because they were foreign. Had they not been foreign women in Athens, they would likely not have even made it into the historical record, because their lives would have been like most other citizen women's--safe from prosecutions, safe from the need for or charges of sex work, safe from violence, safe from sale into slavery, safe from execution. Their children would have also been safer and not marked out for the same violence their mothers experienced.  

I've spent the better part of 5 years living with these women as my research subject and daily I am struck by how relevant they are to our world. Because we aren't all "just women" or even "women first." We are variably white women, women of color, citizen women, immigrant women, wealthy women, not so wealthy women, tenured women, contingently employed women, well supported women, or women with little to no support networks to speak of (to name only a few variations). All this variety can't be hidden under the name "women" alone. The permutations of our existences matter, these other identities shape our experiences as women. Some women live closer to power, have better access to justice. Others do not. To pretend that the lack of access that being a person of color or immigrant or not wealthy doesn't mean as much as being woman alone is a mark of one's access to power--the closer you are, the less those other permutations of womanhood matter. It's a truth of privilege not just now, but in the past, too.




Immigrants and Cruelty

Tomb of Eirene from the city of Byzantium, buried in
Piraeus, Athens. Her name is recorded in both Greek
and Phoenician script. 4th century BCE.
Photo by Rebecca Kennedy. 
There are days when my scholarship and teaching resonate with the modern world more than others. Today is one such day. Yesterday, Pres. Trump rescinded the executive order known as DACA, passed in 2012 to protect so-called "Dreamers," non-citizen residents of the US who were brought here as children and who have lived their entire lives here. DACA created a pathway for them to get work permits, legal identification, attend college, and generally participate in everyday life without fear of deportation to places they have never known. DACA isn't perfect--they had to register and re-register every 2 years. And it was only a deferment of possible deportation.

Although there is some talk of Congress acting to pass legislation that will replace the executive order, history suggests to me that there are enough members of Congress for whom the cruelty of deporting these individuals is "just business" that no law will come. AG Jeff Sessions seemed particularly pleased at the announcement. Because sometimes, let's be clear, what is morally right and what is legal are not the same thing; sometimes what is legal is morally reprehensible. This is especially the case when it comes to treatment of immigrants in democratic societies.

In my Eidolon article, "We Condone It by Our Silence," I laid out some of the laws Classical Athens had in place for treatment of immigrants. Its strict citizenship policy and its requirements that resident immigrants (known as metics) register every year with the city and pay an immigrant tax are well documented. The registration policy is actually quite similar to DACA, except that it was the universal policy for immigrants as there was no differentiation between "legal" and "illegal"immigrating, only a failure to register once you did. And failure to register meant sale into slavery--the "deportation" of the ancient world. It didn't matter how long you lived in Athens, even if you were born there and your grandparents were born there--you could rarely become a citizen. To register, you had to have a sponsor. The sponsor had to be a citizen (male, over the age of 30). If you were a man or a family immigrating, you paid 12 obols a year. If you were a single woman, you paid 6. I wrote a book on the women who fall into this latter category, and it is those women I am thinking about today.

We don't know a lot of women from Classical Athens--they weren't permitted to participate in politics and when they appear in court cases or histories, they are often left unnamed. We do see some of the names of metic women, though, in courtroom speeches. They are often being maligned or mistreated. We also see their names on tombstones, where we know they were immigrants because they recorded their city of origin. These women's lives often go unrecognized in our histories or, when they are mentioned, they are discussed as if the slanders of their male citizen attackers are truth. What I want to do in the rest of this post is simply describe a few of their experiences. Like the hundreds of thousands of immigrants in this country whose lives are being upended by the DACA decision, that these women were real people with real lives is too often forgotten or ignored.

Zobia: An immigrant woman in Athens, who had the misfortune of being involved with a citizen man named Aristogeiton. She lent him a cloak and some money one day and upon request for repayment, he seized her and dragged her to the court, seeking to denounce her as an unregistered immigrant. Lucky for her, the tax collector vouched for her as did her sponsor and denied Aristogeiton a chance to make money from selling her into slavery.

Aristogeiton's non-citizen sister: We don't know her name, but we are told a court case against him that he denounced her as an unregistered metic and sold her into slavery. Their brother may have intervened, but we don't know the outcome.

Theoris: Theoris was a n immigrant from Lemnos who seems to have made a living selling medicines and love charms. She got involved with Aristogeiton, who got caught selling fake epilepsy cures, and he offered up Theoris as to blame and as a witch. She and her entire family (including children) were executed for witchcraft.

The Nurse: In a speech attributed to Demosthenes (Against Evergus and Mnesibulus), we learn of an old former nanny, who had once been the speaker's family slave. We don't know her name, but we know how she died. The speaker's father freed her and she married and lived in Athens. After the death of her husband, in her old age, she returned to live with speaker, whom she had cared for when he was a child. In a dispute over a debt, the nurse was attacked by men attempting to rob the home. She was injured and died a few days later. The speaker was distraught, not just because she died, but because there was nothing he could do to punish the men who killed her. She wasn't his slave anymore and she wasn't his relative, so, according to the laws, she had noone to prosecute for her murder. Her death, the death of a former slave and metic, was not considered valuable enough in law to hold anyone accountable.

I am reminded of these immigrant women and more in Athens when I read of women dropping charges of domestic abuse for fear of deportation. Or women being granted sanctuary in a churches to avoid being deported and separated from her citizen children. The callousness of those who support the end of DACA, who will never be impacted by it personally, who say "just deport the whole family."  The idea that these women, because they were "immigrants," were somehow worth less than others, makes me angry. It should make us angry to see it still happening now.

All the talk of progress and here we are where the Athenians were 2500 years ago, treating some people as if they are as much cattle. What did they do to deserve this treatment? This disregard? What makes our nation so frightened of them? Or our land so limited and small or poor that we can't possibly house them? Aristogeiton preyed on these women because he could, because he clearly kept getting away with it. The court cases where these crimes are listed are not about those crimes, but about other offences against citizen men. The men who killed the nurse also got away with it. Immoral men still get away with hateful acts especially when they prey on non-citizens, those deemed somehow less worthy of human status. And I'm angry. And sad.

CONSENT AND RAPE: IS IT A MODERN THING? NO.

I was involved recently in a Facebook blowout, one of those “Someone Was Wrong on the Internet” moments where I had to take a deep breath and walk away in the realization that nothing I said, no evidence I brought out, would convince the interlocutor (who was mansplaining one of my areas of expertise to me) that he was not correct. What was the issue? Commenting on an article in Teen Vogue (leaders of the modern resistance) about  how sex with slaves was always rape, he threw out the “x is a modern idea” trope, i.e. consent doesn’t really apply in the past because we modern PC types invented it. That isn’t true. Ancient laws for both rape and adultery dating back as far as the Gortyn law code (6th century BCE) clearly factor consent--either of the women, if free, or the owner, if a slave--into what sort of crime has been committed [EDIT TO ADD: a colleague pointed out that Hammurabi's law code also contains this type of law]. If no consent was given by the woman (or even the slave in some instanced), the crime was hubris, i.e. rape. In fact, the idea of rape itself can only exist in a world where it is assumed that sex needs to be agreed upon by the parties involved.

So, let's start with the obvious: there is a difference between rape and not rape. In ancient Greece, rape typically fell under laws associated with hubris--the outrage against or abuse of another person intended to cause shame. I know, I know. Everyone thinks the word means arrogance, but that is its least common usage in Greek texts! Anyway, point being, the Greeks placed having sex with someone against their will under the category of hubris. They didn't have a single specific word for "rape", as far as I can tell. Athenian texts just use hubris. The Gortyn law code uses κάρτει (for κρατέω), which means to "force", "conquer", "control", or "seize"  or δαμάζω, "to subdue"  or "tame".  Either way, implicit in both words is the idea that rape is done without the person's consent. That there are laws against it, therefore, mean that the Greeks had a concept of consent. Otherwise, sex is just sex, regardless of whether the object of one's affections agrees to have it or not. And I say "object of affection" because men and women alike could be raped according to the law.

The Romans aren't much different. In fact, both the words for "rape" and "consent" are Latin! Rapio means to seize or take something/someone through violence. If someone has been "rapio-ed", they have been "ravished" or "raped". The Romans also used other words--in the story of Lucretia's rape by Sextus Tarquinius, he is said to "capture her by force" (per vim capit, 1.57.10). Capio has both neutral and violent connotations, but means essentially the same thing as rapio and κρατέω in its violent uses. And the story of Lucretia really gets at the heart of the issue of whether or not consent was "a modern idea" only. I'll quote some of the story (in English translation; you can read it in full here):

A few days afterwards Sextus Tarquinius went, unknown to Collatinus, with one companion to Collatia. He was hospitably received by the household, who suspected nothing, and after supper was conducted to the bedroom set apart for guests. When all around seemed safe and everybody fast asleep, he went in the frenzy of his passion with a naked sword to the sleeping Lucretia, and placing his left hand on her breast, said, ‘Silence, Lucretia! I am Sextus Tarquinius, and I have a sword in my hand; if you utter a word, you shall die.’
When the woman, terrified out of her sleep, saw that no help was near, and instant death threatening her, Tarquin began to confess his passion, pleaded, used threats as well as entreaties, and employed every argument likely to influence a female heart. When he saw that she was inflexible and not moved even by the fear of death, he threatened to disgrace her, declaring that he would lay the naked corpse of the slave by her dead body, so that it might be said that she had been slain in foul adultery. By this awful threat, his lust triumphed over her inflexible chastity, and Tarquin went off exulting in having successfully attacked her honour.
While some might say that she "consented", because she finally agreed after being threatened with death and with shame to let him rape her, Livy is very clear (as is the rest of Roman tradition) that she was forced against her will, that she did not consent, and, therefore, it was not adultery, but rape. Lucretia committed suicide (1.58)--her body was "violated" (violatum), but her soul was innocent (animus insons), and death was her proof of innocence (mors testis erit). She was innocent of a crime (adultery), but was too chaste to allow anyone to slander her as if she had. History has proven Lucretia's fears that she would not be believed otherwise, but with her death, she began a revolution. How so? Because sex by force was not just sex to the Romans. It was rape.

On one last note, we can muddy the waters here even more for those who say that consent is a modern idea only--adultery. In the laws of most Greek city-states in antiquity, the woman was not held responsible for adultery. One of the most well-known cases attesting to this is that of Euphiletus again the adulterer Eratosthenes, preserved in Euphiletus' speech written by Lysias. In Attic law, essentially, a woman was not considered mentally competent enough to consent to non-marital sex (whether she consented to marital sex is not at issue). Athenian law allowed Euphiletus to kill Eratosthenes on the spot if he caught him with his wife (or daughter or mother or household member). The wife, on the other hand, couldn't be harmed other than she would be divorced and sent back to her father (or brother). She was considered incapable of consenting to seduction legally, but the divorce implied that she did consent. 

If the perpetrator is committing adultery (seduction), then he can be killed on the spot. If he is raping her, he is committing hubris and is NOT legally able to be killed on the spot. The woman's CONSENT matters--even if she is not legally considered adult enough to be responsible for giving it under the strain of seduction. And, although a colleague of mine once said that he was sure women divorced for adultery were stigmatized, we have evidence that shows they still were remarried (the law just stipulated that they had to wait about 10 months before doing so).

The Gortyn law code is similar--the adultery law stipulates that if "someone" (always a man) is caught in adultery with women of various statuses, the man is punished. No punishment at all is given for the women in the laws. What this implies is that adultery is a crime of consent--the consent of whoever the male legal representative (kurios) is of the woman--father, husband, brother, owner (for slaves). So, adultery, like rape, involves consent. The difference is that the women must consent to avoid it being rape, the kurios must consent to avoid adultery. And, just on an aside--the Gortyn law code also stipulates that in cases of "he said, she said" involving slaves, the female slave is believed over whoever rapes her. This is, of course, intended to protect her owner's property (her), but it is still a pretty amazing stipulation.

What can we say about the notion that "consent is a modern idea"? Well, I think it is pretty clear that if there are laws differentiating rape from sex and laws concerning adultery, there is inherently a concept of consent. The problem for my FaceBook interlocutor, it seems, is a confusion over the notion of "affirmative consent" and simple consent. Affirmative consent--the idea that a woman must say or indicate "yes" explicitly at every stage of a sexual interaction--is modern, consent is not. To use one of my students' favorite (inaccurate) trite phrases, "since the beginning of time", laws have distinguished rape from not rape by asking the question "did they consent?". So, in answer to the question "Is consent a modern idea?", the answer is clearly "no".




ELECTIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ANCIENT ATHENS

The following is the text of a talk I gave in the fall for our Tuesday Lunch Series (the iTunes U podcast with the slideshow can be found here, #35). 




Today I want to talk about the role of elections in a democracy through the lens of the ancient Athenian democracy. Modern Americans tend, despite their low rates of participation, to think that elections are a fundamental part of a democracy. Whenever we speak of a country opening itself to democracy, the first thing we talk of is open elections. If a newly formed government manages to hold fair elections, we call it a triumph for democracy. But why is this? What does an election symbolize for us that give it such status?

Thankfully, the US is in a perpetual election cycle, so one needs simply to turn on the TV or radio or read an article to find the answer. A couple of examples should suffice:

  1. For example, when the democrats took control of both the House and Senate in the 2006 midterm elections, politicians, journalist and pundits alike referred to the victory as a “rebuke of” or “referendum on” the former President Bush’s war policy. One journalist referred to the Democrats as “riding a powerful wave of public anger over the war in Iraq and scandal at home.” We have now heard the same message repeatedly during the Tea Party “wave” that took back the House—it was a referendum on President Obama’s health care or other policies. The next election will supposedly be a referendum on someone’s economic policy, be it the President, the Democrats, or the House Republicans—take your pick. 
  2. I want to get into the Way-back machine for this one and go to the 2004 elections: In a Washington Post article after the elections, journalists summed up former President Bush’s understanding of the election results. According to the article, the then president said that: ...the public’s decision to reelect him was a ratification of his approach toward Iraq and that there was no reason to hold any administration officials accountable for mistakes or misjudgments in prewar planning or managing the violent aftermath. “We had an accountability moment, and that’s called the 2004 election”. When the Obama administration took over in 2008, there was a push to investigate the Bush administration on issues relating to the war in Iraq, among other things. But no investigation materialized. Perhaps Bush was right and the accountability moment had passed (despite the 2006 midterm “rebuke”). 
These two examples suggest that for Americans elections serve two functions. First, they express the will of the people: they allow us to voice our opinions on government policy. Second, they are a way of holding public officials accountable.

QUESTIONS: But, today I want to investigate with you whether elections are really democratic at all, let alone function as expressions of the will of the people and as a form of accountability? To get at this problem, I want to look back to the first democracy, the democracy of ancient Athens and to think about the nature of Athens’ democracy, what were its ideals, what were some of its practical manifestations and, finally, what a fuller understanding of the Athenian model might offer us as Americans when considering our own assessments of democracy and its mechanisms. Specifically, did the Athenians conceive of elections as fundamental to their democracy? Were elections an expression of the DEMOS? And, finally, were they a measure of accountability for officials?

 To start, I should highlight some of the major components of Athenian democracy for you to put some of the differences between our two systems into perspective:
  • Direct participation by all members of the citizen body. All citizens had the right to sit in the Assembly and vote on legislations directly. After a certain age, they were also able to speak on and propose legislation of their own. Also, pretty much every citizen would at one point in their life serve as one of the members of the Council that was in charge of running the Assembly meetings and setting the daily agendas. 
  • Eleutheria: freedom as a political value. It is rather abstract but in practice was manifested through things like parrhesia—freedom of speech in the assembly and in the courts. 
  • Isonomia: equality before the law—not social or economic equality, but political. This is actually the word used, it seems, for the system of government the Athenians had; demokratia came into use only late in the fifth century BC and was originally a slur used by opponents of the system. 
  • Lottery: The majority of offices were chosen by lottery. 
  • 5. Access to Courts: The Athenians themselves, considered the courts as the defining institution of democracy. One of the earliest democratic reforms, it originally gave all citizens the right to appeal a magistrate’s sentence to a jury of their peers. By the fifth century BC, it was a regular cottage industry with nearly 1/5 of the citizen population sitting on juries every day (the first 6000 citizens to arrive would be included in the jury pool); nearly every building in the town center itself functioned as a courthouse and their public and private art was filled with depictions of jury votes and court hearings. POLYPRAGMOSUNE (Being a Busy-Body) 
  • Euthuna: The essence of the euthuna was that all magistrates, regardless of whether they were elected by vote or appointed by lottery, were required at the end of their term to undergo a reckoning of their tenure in office. Citizens had a designated three-day period to lodge a complaint against an outgoing official. If the board (drawn by lot, one from each of the 10 tribes) decided there was evidence enough, a trial would be held in the Assembly and the magistrate would have to answer the charges. 
 The Athenian system did not appear all at once, complete as scholars and the History Channel sometimes seem to forget, but developed over a period of 100-150 years between 594 BC and around 450 BC, though development by no means stopped. It had moved in that time, however, from a system wherein aristocrats were elected to hold all public offices and the Assembly basically voted to approve their competing measure to a system whereby any citizen from any economic or social background could and did serve in office, serve on juries, and present and debate legislation to the Assembly.

One thing that sticks out from even a very rough sketch of the development of Athenian democracy over that period is the lack of prominence given elections. In fact, with exception for highly specialized offices, there is a distinct move away from them. As the democracy became more radical (i.e. based on the broadest citizen base), fewer posts were elected or even restricted to the upper classes, but were instead drawn by lot.

We Americans love elections so much, we even vote for positions like county coroner. In ancient Athens, however, they only had two categories of elected posts: military leadership and accountants; both highly specialized positions where you might want someone with certain skill sets—and incidentally, military leaders were the only individuals who could be elected to office consecutively and for more than 2 years total. Every other office, including the highest, the archon, was appointed by lottery drawn from all eligible citizens. The restriction on elected offices suggests that election was not considered the best way to put people into office. The Athenians preferred the whimsy of the lottery gods. Why? Our best sources on answering this question are actually the critics of Athenian democracy (most of our sources about the democracy are from those who were hostile to it—it is often said that political theory originated to try to show how democracy can’t work).

ANCIENT CRITIQUES. One of the greatest criticisms from antiquity leveled at the Athenian democracy was that it preferred to give power to the lower-class, under-educated, morally degenerate masses.  Aristophanes’ Knights parodies demagogues (in this instance a Sausage-seller and a tanner named Paphlagon) pandering to the Demos instead of acting in the city’s best interest. In the world of the comedy (a political satire), the quality of the leadership and the quality of the democracy itself were intimately linked: as one went downhill, so did the other. The so-called Old Oligarch (who was likely not as old as his curmudgeonly moniker suggests), another fifth-century Athenian, tells that the Athenians were well aware of the moral questionability of their leaders, but saw this as the best way to guarantee the survival of democracy. He writes:
When the poor, the ordinary people and the lower classes flourish and increase in numbers, then the power of the democracy will be increased; if however, the rich and the respectable flourish, the democrats increase the strength of their opponents (1.4).

Democracy, in this context, according to opponents of the system, is not interested in good government per se, but rather in preserving the rights and privileges of the ordinary and lower class citizens. Lack of elections, for the Old Oligarch, falls under the penumbra of ways in which the lower classes preserve the democracy at the expense of good government. We’ll consider why in a moment. But the lottery works for those whose interests seem to be most tied to the democracy. The lower classes. They provided Athens with its strength because Athens was a naval power with an empire that depended on a strong fleet. The lower classes manned the fleet, built the ships, provide the helmsmen etc. In other words, as the Old Oligarch goes on to tell us, since Athens’ power in the international community was based on naval strength and the lower classes were the bulwark of the navy, they rightly held power.

Of course, concerning the only elected offices, the Old Oligarch points out:
They (the demos) do not suppose that they ought to be able to cast lots for the post of general or commander of the cavalry, for they realize that they gain greater advantage from not holding these offices themselves but allowing the most capable to hold them (1.3).

What does the Old Oligarch’s position tell us about the role of elections in democratic Athens taken in combination with the actual development of the democracy itself? It tells us a number of things. First, it assumes that elections were advantageous to the “noble and respectable” citizens: namely, the aristocrats, also known as “the capable”. Second, it tells us that elections were not perceived of as in the best interest of democracy. Elections, in fact, are a threat to democracy since, as the Old Oligarch tells us later, if the so-called respectable citizens made the laws, they would not allow anyone they deemed ‘mad’ (i.e. from the mob; hoi polloi) to take part in city affairs.

So, one of the major components of our modern conception of democracy, elections, was conceived of in democratic Athens as un-democratic. Why? Because elections implied that some citizens were more capable, and therefore, perhaps, more equal than others. And the Athenians, while they did not believe that all humans were equal in all ways, had a political system that was premised absolutely on the equality of all citizens before and under the law, isonomia the fundamental principle of Athenian democracy.

Perhaps this is why Pericles, whom we will see more of shortly, in his great Funeral Oration as recounted by the historian Thucydides, is so keen to point out that Athenians were advanced in public through merit, not class (Thuc. 2.37). Athenians were suspicious of those who sought elected office because only the wealthy and aristocratic citizens tended to run. Why, we might ask ourselves? Again, because the aristocracy themselves conceived of popular elections as a badge of honor, a mark of their superiority, not only to other aristocrats, but rather to the people in general.

So, elections were not considered “democratic,” but rather a holdover from Athens’ pre-democratic days, but perhaps, like certain other aspects of Athens’ system, a way to harness the wealth of the aristocracy to its own needs. This brings us to the second issue at hand: accountability. Even if elections weren’t democratic, were they at least an accountability measure? There was one election in Athens—an important one—that no one wanted to win and that might have been a clear accountability measure: OSTRACISM.

OSTRACISM was a sort of reverse election. Every year, the Athenians would gather and vote on a single individual whom they would like to see exiled from the city. If a quorum of 6000 citizens voted and one individual got a majority, then he would be required to leave Attica for the 10-year period. He would not lose his property rights or his citizen status, but he could not return for the 10 years (unless recalled: a rare occasion). Although ostracism was supposedly created as a part of Cleisthenes’ reforms in 508 BC (the modern date for the founding of the democracy) and was aimed at keeping would-be tyrants at bay, it was not actually used until two decades after the reforms when in 487BC a number of men formerly associated with the Peisistratid family, who had ruled Athens from 547-514BC, were ostracized (an event likely tied to the appearance of one of the Peisistratids with the Persian army at the battle of Marathon in 490 BC).

Could such an election be considered a measure for accountability? It seems unlikely actually. Men who had performed great services for Athens, like Miltiades the leading general at the battle of Marathon in 490BC and Themistocles, the architect of Athenian naval policy during the 480s and the hero of Salamis, or Cimon, the leading general in the expansion of Athens’ empire in the 460s, could find themselves out of Athens very soon after their triumphs. This “election” was apparently targeted at preventing any single individual from gaining too much authority. But, it could be rigged, as the cache (CASH) of thousands of ostraka with the name Themistocles on them attests. One need not have done anything other than be prominent or be associated with the wrong family or fall victim to political chicanery to be ostracized. Such chicanery was actually not difficult since the majority of the population was not literate. The mass of ostraka with a single name on it for Themistocles was all carved by the same hand—this suggests something like a campaign “Vote for Themistokles! Get your ostraka here!”

Being ostracized was like being elected general (especially given that many of the ostracized had been generals)—it was not so much a mark of merit but rather name recognition, thus the ostraka with a single name being passed out by the thousands. It is not a coincidence that men whose fathers had been generals (like Pericles and Cimon, or Pericles Jr.) became generals themselves without any previous command experience. And in a few cases, their own fathers had been ostracized as well (both Pericles’ and Cimon’s fathers were).

What about regular elections, not ostracism? ARE THESE ELECTIONS A VALID METHOD FOR HOLDING OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY? According to the Athenians, they were not. An example from the Peloponnesian War will make this clearer.

During the first year of the Peloponnesian War (a war that continued off and on for about 28 years starting in 431 BC), Athens adopted a defensive strategy at the behest of its leading politician and one of the 10 generals, Pericles. This strategy entailed the following: 1. Withdrawal of all citizens from Attica into the city behind the long walls; 2. Maintain and continue strengthening of the navy by which all of Athens’ supplies could be delivered during any Spartan campaigns in Attica; 3. Maintain the status quo in the empire. Pericles thought it best to keep a firm grip on what Athens already had instead of attempting to expand further. This was a good strategy and Thucydides suggests that had the Athenians been able to effectively follow it, they may have, in fact, won the Peloponnesian War or, as was Pericles’ apparent aim, draw a stalemate.

 One consequence of Pericles strategy, however, was both unexpected and devastating—the plague. The plague struck at the beginning of the second year of the war and was the result of a virus carried on a grain ship from Egypt. Under normal circumstances, it is probable that a few people and animals would have died, but because of the increased population in the city (up from 30,000 to at least 4 times that number, with people sleeping in public buildings, temples, etc.), the plague spread like wild fire. The Athenians were sorely distressed. Add to this the fact that the Athenians, who prided themselves on their courage in war, were forced to watch from the walls as the Spartans, for a second straight year, pillaged and laid waste their farms. It did not make for a good situation.

As a result, Thucydides tells us, “a change came over the spirit of the Athenians...They began to find fault with Pericles, as author of the war and the cause of all their misfortune...” (2.59). What follows this statement is a speech by Pericles (which we will come back to shortly). Thucydides goes on to tell us of the people’s reaction:
Such were the arguments by which Pericles tried to cure the Athenians of their anger against him and to divert their thoughts from the immediate afflictions. As a community he succeeded in convincing them; they not only gave up all idea of sending to Sparta for peace, but applied themselves with increased energy to the war; still, as private individuals they could not help smarting under their sufferings...In fact, public feeling against him did not subside until he had been fined. Not long afterwards, however, according to the way of the multitude, they again elected him general and again committed all their affairs to his hands, having now become less sensitive to their private and domestic afflictions, and understanding that he was the best man of all for the needs of the state (Thuc. 2.65.2-4).

 What are we to make of such a thing? The people obviously held Pericles responsible for their sufferings, and rightly so, some would say, since it was his policy which led directly to their two biggest complaints, the unchallenged ravishing of their homesteads by the Spartans and the spread of the plague. And yet they re-elected him. Why?

Thucydides is a biased observer. It is well accepted that Pericles is, for Thucydides, as close to the ideal statesman as can be. No one can compare. But even within the frame of Thucydides’ bias, there is something sincere that can be understood about the demos’s desire to reelect Pericles while still not agreeing with or endorsing his policy. And that is grounded within the rhetoric of the speech Thucydides gives Pericles to calm the people’s anger.

Pericles will appeal to three sentiments of the Athenians: Patriotism, self-responsibility and resolve in time of war. And it is the arousal of these sentiments that will convince the Athenians, despite their misgivings, to re-elect Pericles as the most capable man of carrying them through to the end of the war. Let’s look at a bit of the rhetoric:

Thuc. 2.60.2-4: I am of opinion that national greatness is more for the advantage of private citizens, than any individual well being coupled with public humiliation. A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords chances of salvation to unfortunate individuals. Since then a state can support the misfortunes of private citizens, while they cannot support hers, it is surely the duty of every one to be forward in her defense, and not like you to be so confounded with your domestic afflictions as to give up all thoughts of the common safety, and to blame me for having counseled war and yourselves for having voted it.

Thuc. 2.61.4: Born, however, as you are, citizens of a great state, and brought up, as you have been, with habits equal to your birth, you should be ready to face the greatest disasters and still to keep unimpaired the luster of your name. For the judgment of mankind is as relentless to the weakness that falls short of a recognized renown, as it is jealous of the arrogance that aspires higher than its due. Cease then to grieve for your private afflictions, and address yourselves instead to the safety of the commonwealth.

Thuc. 2.64.1-3: But you must not be seduced by citizens like these nor be angry with me—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves—in spite of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands... Remember, too, that if your country has the greatest name in all the world, it is because she never bent before disaster; because she has expended more life and effort in war than any other city, and has won for herself a power greater than any hitherto known, the memory of which will descend to the latest posterity; even if now, in obedience to the general law of decay, we should ever be forced to yield, still it will be remembered that we held rule over more Hellenes than any other Hellenic state, that we sustained the greatest wars against their united or separate powers, and inhabited a city unrivalled by any other in resources or magnitude.


Pericles’ rhetoric works on many levels. First, he co-opts the people into responsibility repeatedly by reminding them that, though war was his recommendation, they did vote for it in the Assembly. How can they now be angry when the war does not go as easily as they had hoped? Secondly, he reminds them that uncontrollable emergencies, like the plague, happen. The best citizens know how to deal with these setbacks and prevail. Next, Pericles emphasizes that the fate of a single individual is truly nothing when compared to the greater good. In fact, the true sign of a great patriot is to submerge his own identity beneath that of the city and be prepared to sacrifice for its sake. If an individual falls, the state will survive. If the state falls, the individual cannot survive. Lastly, and most importantly, Pericles plays on the greatness of the city and the vast benefits the citizens receive as a result of being citizens at Athens and he reminds them of how they were first invaded by the enemy and yet did not buckle. They showed great fortitude, worthy of their great name, worthy of their great city, and should continue to do so even as the war turns unpleasant. That the Athenians reelect Pericles despite their disagreement with his particular policy should not be surprising in the face of such a rhetorical onslaught. He has pressed all the right buttons. But is the reelection an endorsement of Pericles’ policy as such? Is it an accountability moment? Absolutely not. When Pericles dies that same year, the Athenians immediately resolve upon an aggressive offensive policy that is in direct conflict with Pericles’ defensive strategy (Five major expeditions in 2 years, in fact).

Consider also that Pericles’ position is one of the few elected positions, that of general. The people are obviously unhappy with his performance in the course of the war, but he is re-elected because he is a known entity having been general every year for the last decade and his father had been general before him. Pericles’ rhetorical strategy emphasizes his steadfastness, his experience and the idea of responsibility—the qualities almost always viewed as favorable in times of instability. Pericles was no flip-flopper.  Regardless of how positive Thucydides presents Pericles and his re-election, Thucydides’ statement that the people re-elected him because they recognized that he was the best man, the most capable, reinforces the Old Oligarch’s contention that elections favor the aristocracy, not the demos because name recognition trumps agreement or disagreement with actual policy.
Thus, when Thucydides gives his encomium of Pericles (Pericles’ death is mentioned right after the people fine him and reelect him) and tells us that, while Pericles lived, Athens was a democracy in name only but in truth a rule by its first citizen, we understand what?
  1. The interests of the many have been overshadowed by the will of an individual who has been granted extraordinary authority. But this authority is hidden under the guise of elections, thus somehow the people are voluntarily relinquishing this authority. There is a paternalism inherent in the elective process—the “best” men take care of the city on behalf of the less capable Demos (liturgies, benefactors, etc). 
  2. The fact that his elected office is one that can be held year after year without restriction (unlike most lottery positions which can only be held twice ever and at 10 year intervals) suggests that their policies are not what is being voted on but only the power of the name. 
  3. The re-election of Pericles in particular should not be viewed as an endorsement of his policies nor an act of accountability—they fined him just previous to re-electing him as a mark of their dissatisfaction. This, not the election, was the accountability moment. The complete reversal of his policies almost immediately upon his death suggests strongly that they did not agree with them and had little intention of continuing with them. 

So, if elections weren’t democratic nor measures of accountability, what was a democratic accountability measure in ancient Athens? The EUTHUNA, which is probably the process by which Pericles was removed from office and fined in the situation just discussed and which has no parallel in American system. The euthuna, in fact, is, in some ways, in direct opposition, to the American way of thinking. We seem to prefer to hear all the juicy tidbits of an administration in best-seller form some time after that magistrate’s tenure has ended, preferably at a safe distance in time from the actual events. Any sort of accountability procedures initiated during an officials’ tenure or shortly thereafter is often considered, at least in Washington, as political shenanigans. The Athenians demanded an accounting on the spot.

EUTHUNAI: The euthuna was a powerful tool for keeping check on officials, especially elected officials like the board of generals, though it applied to all officials, elected or lottery. Its purpose seems to have been to intimidate officials from taking bribes and from extorting funds: they had to give a reckoning of all money spent at the end of term as part of the process. A downside to this may have been, especially in the case of military officials, a hindrance to aggressive and sometimes necessary but unpleasant actions in war. One very prominent example of this is the fate of the generals at the battle of Arginusae in 406BC, with which I will end my talk today. It is an extreme account of accountability of public officials, but that was its purpose. It was meant to underscore the absolute power of the people over their elected officials.

Our main source for the events surrounding the battle of Arginusae is Xenophon’s Hellenica:
  • Now there are ten generals voted every year, one from each tribe. Of the generals for the year 406BC, eight were at the battle of Arginusae. These eight generals fought a naval engagement against the Spartans and were actually victorious. After the battle, however, the eight generals assigned two men, Theramenes and Thrasybulus , 47 ships with the task of picking up the bodies of the dead Athenians for burial. A severe storm arose that prevented the retrieval from being carried out and so the bodies were lost—failure to bury the bodies was a sacrilege that put the whole city at risk. 
  • Afterwards, 6 of the 8 generals returned to Athens to find themselves facing a trial for misconduct as generals for failure to retrieve the bodies. Interestingly enough, one of the main accusers was Theramenes (the man actually assigned to pick up the bodies—a CYA maneuver if ever there was one). After a series of procedural wranglings, including a measure to try the generals altogether instead of separately as was their right, the 8 generals (the 6 present and the 2 who did not return to Athens) were condemned to death for betraying the Athenian people. Accountability, indeed. 
Now this is an extreme example of euthuna. In fact, it was not a formal euthuna since the generals were tried together instead of being given individual trials in which to give their own reckonings and defenses. But it shows how central to the democracy was the idea of accountability. In fact, so powerful was the fear of this accountability among the generals that 2 chose not to return rather than face the displeasure of the people (They spent the better part of a decade in exile looking for ways to return to the city).

The primary defense speech on behalf of the generals’ right to individual trials is likely the key to understanding the centrality of accountability for the democracy. One Athenian, Euryptolemus asks of the Assembly:

What is it, pray, that you fear, that you are in such excessive haste? Do you fear lest you will lose   the right to put to death and set free anyone you please if you proceed in accordance with the law, but think that you will retain this right if you proceed in violation of the law, by the method which Callixeinus persuaded the Assembly to report to the people, that is, by a single vote? (1.7.26; Slide 15)

 Euryptolemus’ question is on a point of law, but it hits at the heart of the matter, the people’s fears that they will wake up one day and their authority over their officials would disappear and along with it, their democracy. This is exactly, I might add, what had happened only 5 years earlier when a group of aristocratic citizens, known as the 400 Oligarchs, convinced the Assembly to vote itself out of existence for the sake of state security. It would also happen again, only 3 years later, when a group of 30 aristocrats became tyrants of Athens and disbanded the courts, disenfranchised 90% of the citizen- body and executed without trial 1000s of residents and confiscated their property. Perhaps their fears weren’t so irrational?

What, then, can we conclude about the relationship between elections, accountability of public officials and democracy in Athens?
  • Elections were seen as favoring the aristocratic members of society and were not favorable to the democracy. 
  • Accountability, especially of the few offices that were chosen by popular election, was seen as a lynch pin of the power of the people, given as far back as the time of Solon and considered a necessary component for a functioning democracy. 
And what about our moments of “accountability”? Taken in this light, were the voters punishing their Congressmen for supporting unpopular policies? Or did the re-election of Bush serve to demonstrate approval of his and his appointees activities? If we look to the Athenian model and the first democracy, elections are NOT a method of accountability. Rather they are a mechanism that reinforces the status quo separately from any real method of accountability. Elections presented the populace with prominent men from a small segment of the population, from the upper socio-economic classes, as choices—a hold over from the days of aristocratic governance—and served more often to reinforce elite views of their own political importance. Elections, along with liturgies, were ways for aristocrats to rank themselves against each other. Real accountability for the Athenians rested with the end of term reckoning, the euthuna—and this, not elections, was the key to a strong democracy.
Does this mean that our democracy has no method for holding officials accountable since we don’t have a public reckoning upon the completion of a term in office? Not necessarily. But it does mean that maybe we should be a little more cautious when touting the upcoming elections as a true measure of accountability on the policies of a party or administration, or of thinking that any radical change could be affected by simply electing new members of the American governing class into the White House.

One reason why studying the ancient world can be useful and interesting is because it provides us with models through which to consider the contemporary world. The ancients are at once alien and familiar to us. No, of course, ancient Athenian democracy is different from the modern American version. But many of the institutions we have, the ideals upon which they are founded and the rhetoric to which we turn in discussing them do have their roots in Ancient Athens (as well as, of course, Rome).

The Athenian evidence at the very least should lead us to question whether elections such as ours are really cut out for doing the democratic work we ask of them. The Athenian evidence also gives us a license to do something becoming almost completely forbidden in our modern Democracy – criticize it. Could there be a better way of holding our officials to account? What would a modern euthuna look like? What would it do? What about introducing a lottery for officials? Think about what that would mean for us? When our own democracy seems to many ineffective, or dysfunctional, a look at the earliest attempts to open up government to the whole community can be a remarkably powerful tool, even a dangerous one. Thinking about Athens was certainly beneficial a few centuries ago for a certain group of men considering establishing a new form of democratic government in their newly liberated community. But, they were elites and they rejected the Athenian model as too radical with too much power in the hands of the “people”. Maybe we should rethink Athens and reconsider whether the Founding Fathers were right about that.